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ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD REVEALS THAT MR. HOLLEN'S APPOINTED TRIAL
COUNSEL COMPLETELY FAILED TO HAVE THE TRIAL COURT, AS
THE ARBITER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADMISSIBILITY OF
IDENTIFICATION, PRELIMINARILY TEST AND DETERMINE THE
RELIABILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AS A
MATTER OF DUE PROCESS.

The State argues that Mr. Hollen's appointed trial counsel made
a "carefully considered decision" not to file a Ramirez
Brief of Appellee, p. 11.
contradict

the

State's

motion.

See

Not only does a review of the record

argument,

it

proves

that

Mr.

Hollen's

appointed trial counsel completely failed to have the trial court
preliminarily test and determine the constitutional reliability of
the eyewitness identifications upon which the State's case solely
relied.
Notwithstanding the State's effort to minimize the problems with
the

eyewitness

identifications

in

the

instant

case,

the

record

reveals numerous glaring problems that call into serious question the
See State

reliability of the eyewitness identifications.
817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State
493

(Utah

1986)).

First,

all

of

the

v.

Long,

witnesses

v.

Ramirez,

721 P.2d 483,
had

a

limited

opportunity to view the robber and a limited degree of attention
during the event.

See R. 156-57, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II) (Mark

Mudrow testified that he had a total of "thirty seconds maybe" to
view the robber with the bandage, and that "[t]he whole time he had

4

me facing away")/ x see

id.

at R. 171-72 (Mark Mudrow testified that

it was a dim lighted theater); see

id.

at R. 180, 184 lines 13-16

(Heidi Maroney testified that she had only a matter of seconds to
view the robber with the bandage, that it was ''pretty dark . . . not
well lit," and that she was "[f]acing the wall the entire time");
id.

see

at R. 202, lines 20-24, R. 217-18 (Megan Brimhall testified that

she had
which

u

[m] aybe four or five seconds" to view the robber, after

she

admitted

that

she

initially

told

the

investigating

detective that she had been "looking away from the Hispanic-looking
suspect"
(Nathan

(i.e., the robber with the bandage); see id.
Nance

testified

that

he

u

[w]asn't

aware

at R. 232-33
of

[robber]", i.e., the robber with bandage on his face); see
249, lines 1-6

the

other

id.

at R.

(Nicole George testified that she viewed the robbei

for less than a minute).

Moreover, the State in its brief neglects

to mention that the robbery was completed quickly and at least one
half of the robber's face was obstructed with a large bandage.
id.

See

at R. 162, lines 21-24; R. 163, lines 13-42.2

x

In addition to the limited opportunity and attention to view the
robber, Mark Mudrow testified at trial that on the night of the
robbery he was not wearing his glasses that he utilizes to correct
his nearsightedness. See R. 164-65, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II).
2

In footnote 2 of its brief, the State cites Common wealth
v.
Levia,
431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass. 1982), in the course of attempting
to justify appointed trial counsel's failure to have the trial court
determine
the
constitutional
reliability
of
the
eyewitness
identifications. The State argues that there are valid reasons for
not moving to suppress a weaker identification when there are
multiple identifications. Not only is Levia factually inapplicable
5

The State also conveniently omits from its analysis the fact
that there was approximately a four-month lapse of time between the
robbery and the time when Mr. Hollen became a suspect.
101; R. 116, lines 14-19

Id.

at R.

(testimony that the information received

about Mr. Hollen was the third time Police received
concerning possible suspects of the robbery).

information

Prior to Mr. Hollen

becoming a suspect, two of the eyewitnesses who testified at Mr.
Hollen's trial had identified another individual by the name of
Michael Cantu from a photo lineup as the robber with the bandage on
his face.

See

id.

at R. 106-07; R. 108, lines 16-20.

In fact, when

Heidi Maroney was shown the photographs of Mr. Cantu, she "backed up
a step and put her hand to her mouth" and began shaking.

Id.

at R.

107, lines 9-15.

Id.

at R.

She then stated, "That looks like him."

107, lines 15-16.
Further, the circumstances under which the robbery was observed
create a low likelihood that the eyewitnesses would later perceive,
remember, and relate the event correctly.

See, e.g.,

id.

at R. 164,

lines 12-13 (Mark Mudrow testified that he was "frightened"); see

id.

at R. 181, line 4, R. 184, lines 10-12, R. 184, lines 14-17 (Heidi
Maroney testified, "I was scared to death . . . extremely scared . .

inasmuch as all of the of the identifications in the instant case are
constitutionally weak, but Levia,
as a matter of law, is inapplicable

because it is a

"pre-Strickland

case.

Strickland

v.

Washington,

466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Finally, this supposed
trial strategy was not in any way articulated by appointed trial
counsel at the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing before the trial court.
6

. nervous and scared, crying and -- . . . upset . . . unstable");
id.

see

at R. 247, lines 5-8 (Nicole George testified that the robber was

pointing a gun around at "all of us"); see
(Nicole

George

unreliability

testified,
of

the

"I

was

eyewitness

id.

at R. 249, lines 19-20

scared").

Moreover,

identifications

is

the

further

exacerbated by the fact that some of the eyewitnesses were making
what they initially thought was a cross-racial identification.
at R. 216, lines 5-18; R. 103, lines 7-11; R. 192-93.

Id.

The low

likelihood that the eyewitnesses perceived, remembered, and related
the event correctly is further buttressed by both the previously
discussed passage of time between the robbery and when Mr. Hollen
became

a

suspect

and

by

the

apparent

inaccurate

or

false

identifications of Mr. Cantu by the eyewitnesses a short time after
the robbery.3
Perhaps

most

important,

is

the

fact

that

the

eyewitness

identifications at trial were seriously tainted by the witnesses'
exposure

to

Mr.

Hollen

at

the

Preliminary

Hearing,

where

the

witnesses viewed Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant in the course of
their appearance as suspects while they were in custody, wearing
handcuffs

and

jail

clothing.

See

3

id.

at

R.

85, lines

19-21.

The reliability of the eyewitness identifications is further
eroded by the fact that the eyewitnesses identified a bandage and
medical tape found at the residence of another separate and distinct
suspect as being "identical" to that utilized in the robbery in the
instant case. See R. 128-29, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I ) .
7

Notwithstanding

the

knowledge

of

the

tainted

eyewitness

identifications, Mr. Hollen's appointed trial counsel made no effort,
other than an ineffectual motion in limine, to identify the extent of
the tainted

identifications or to expressly exclude by name the

witnesses present at the Preliminary Hearing.

See R. 486-87, Motion

In Limine.

Neither the Motion nor the in-chambers conference between

the

court

trial

and

counsel

concerning

the Motion

included

any

discussion about which witnesses, if not all, that were present at
the Preliminary Hearing or the legal effects of the eyewitnesses
having viewed the accused under the highly suggestive circumstances
that they did.

In fact, at the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, trial

counsel was unable to articulate the identity of the eyewitnesses
present at the Preliminary Hearing even though he was well-aware that
the eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant at the
Preliminary

Hearing

as

the

handcuffs and jail clothing.

accused
See id.

robbers

in custody,

wearing

at R. 85, lines 19-21; see

also

R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 21. 4
In sum, under the facts in the instant case, there exists a lack
of any conceivable

tactical basis

actions or lack thereof.
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)

See State

for appointed
v.

(citing State v.

4

Bryant,
Garrett,

trial

counsel's

965 P. 2d 539, 542
849 P.2d 578, 579

The prejudice to Mr. Hollen by the tainted eyewitness testimony
is further underscored by the fact that, prior to the preliminary
hearing, the eyewitnesses never had the opportunity to view Mr.
Hollen or his co-defendant in person or by way of a live line-up.
8

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v.

Moritzsky,

111 P.2d 688, 692

(Utah Ct. App. 1989)) . Appointed trial counsel consequently rendered
objectively deficient performance by failing to require the trial
court to analyze and make a preliminary determination as to the
constitutional

reliability

and

admissibility

of

the

eyewitness

identifications.

II.

BY WAY OF THE UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF GUILT,
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY
TO MR. HOLLEN AND THEREBY DEPRIVED MR. HOLLEN OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY ADVISE MR. HOLLEN OF
THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TESTIFY.

In its brief, the State

argues that counsel's concurrence with

Mr. Hollen's decision not to testify at trial did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.

See Brief of Appellee, pp. 19-24.

Besides the essential failure to address the merits of Mr. Hollen's
arguments concerning the breach of the duty of loyalty set out in the
Brief

of

Appellant,

the

State

fails

to

recognize,

and

thereby

acknowledges, that Mr. Hollen could not and did not make an informed
decision concerning the right to testify because he had not been
adequately advised about the consequences of exercising the right to
testify.

See R. 516-18, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of

Fact, Nos. 37-40 (finding that appointed trial counsel "spent little
time discussing Mr. Hollen's right to testify with him").

9

The trial court's own Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of
Fact

demonstrate

that

appointed

trial

counsel,

based

on

his

unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty, constructively,
if not actually, denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his client.
See id.

at R. 517-18, No. 40.

not

testify

to

on

a

Rather than basing his legal advice

well-reasoned

analysis

of

Utah

case

law

concerning the likely consequences of Mr. Hollen's testimony if he
were to testify, appointed trial counsel simply failed to zealously
pursue the interests of Mr. Hollen in the course of advising him not
to testify.

See

R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary

Hearing), p. 69, lines 3-12.5
constitutional

right

to

With little of no advice concerning the

testify

and

the

specific

benefits

and

disadvantages of testifying at trial, appointed trial counsel assumed
Mr. Hollen's guilt and then utilized his unwarranted assumption as
the basis for advising Mr. Hollen to waive his constitutional right
to testify.

Cf.

Rule 1.2(a), Rules of Professional Conduct (stating

that "[i]n a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after

consultation

with

the

lawyer,

as to . . . whether the

client will testify") (Emphasis added).

5

By arguing that Mr. Hollen's testimony would not have altered
the outcome of the trial, the State not only gives short shrift to
the
previously
discussed
unreliability
of
the
eyewitness
identifications but it underestimates the value of a defendant
looking the jurors squarely in the eye and testifying that he or she
did not commit the crime.
10

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as the Brief of Appellant
previously filed with this Court, Mr. Hollen respectfully requests
that this Court reverse his convictions of Aggravated Robbery and
Aggravated Kidnaping and for such other relief as the Court deems
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25

day of February, 2000.

ARNOLD f&sWIGGINS , P . C .

'1tfigg\ms
Attorneys^air Appellant
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ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(11).
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